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2 Gary R. Habermas

SKEPTICISM: HUME
CHAPTER SUMMARY

The Enlightenment period was characterized by differing strains of
intellectual thought, from which emerged the skeptical philosophy of
David Hume (1711-1776). He held that many accepted philosophical
and theological beliefs were devoid of epistemological proof and therefore could not be known with certainty to be true. His twofold attack
against the inerrancy of Scripture consisted initially of denying the
particular evidences in the form of miracles by holding to the superiority of man's experience for the laws of nature. Also, he further posited
empirical standards of judgment against the Christian belief in the
inspiration of Scripture as a whole. By these specific means, in particular, Hume possibly exercised the greatest influence on the rejection of
inerrancy by critical philosophers and theologians of various schools of
thought from his time to the present.
In spite of the immense influence of his critique, both Hume and
those who have generally followed him in these endeavors are refuted
on several accounts in their attempts to dismiss either miracles or the
inerrancy of Scripture as a whole. In particular, they failed by not
ascertaining if there is a God who chose to act in history by temporarily
suspending the laws of nature and in written revelation in Scripture.
Since both Hume and his followers have failed in their endeavor to
dismiss the truthfulness of such beliefs, the possibility of a Christian
theistic world view certainly remains.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT was a particularly significant
period in the formulation of modern thought. The seventeenth
century marked the development of three strains that later
dominated Enlightenment philosophy. The chiefly Continental
movement known as rationalism received its impetus from Rene
Descartes (1596-1650). This philosophy was further developed
by such scholars as Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried
Leibniz (1646-1716). Deism emerged from the teachings of
Herbert ofCherbury (1583-1648) and was popular in England
chiefly among such scholars as M;=ttthew Tindal (c. 1655-1733)
and John Toland (1670-1722). British empiricism grew out of
the thought of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Within the empirical
tradition were John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (c.
1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-1776). These three
philosophical traditions are often grouped because their
methodologies are closely related to one another.
Enlightenment philosophers espoused concepts that have had
great influence on twentieth-century epistemology. For this reason, a brief overview of these three movements that arose during
the Enlightenment will provide background for identifying and
evaluating David Hume's influence on the denial of biblical authority.
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notions" about religion: the existence of a supreme God, the
worship of God, the need to live a moral life, repentance from
sin, and an eternal life of either reward or punishment. 3 He
offered these as principles that are the foundation of world religions and that constitute the essence of true religion. These five
principles, Herbert claimed, are based on mankind's common
reason.
The major endeavor of the deists was to formulate a natural
religion based on reason as the primary authority. For some
scholars, including Herbert of Cherbury, reason could support
the orthodox understanding of the Christian faith. There were
discrepancies between this approach and revealed Christianity,
but this form of deism was not an outright attempt to disprove
Christian belief.
Other deists, however, presented their positions as alternatives to revealed religion. Matthew Tindal, for example, considered "true" Christianity to be synonymous with natural religion.
In his view, all doctrines not conforming to reason were to be
rejected. Miracles were dismissed and morality was stressed.
John Toland also believed that nothing in the Bible could
conflict with reason. Therefore, miracles were given natural explanations. To these deists, comparative religion and critical
investigations of Christianity were popular studies. In fact,
deism had a major influence on biblical criticism. The stress on
reason led to close similarities to rationalism, but the deists were
also affected by the British empiricists.
Rebuttals to those deists who were critical of Christianity were
offered by such philosophers as John Locke (see below), Thomas
Sherlock (1678-1761),Joseph Butler (1692-1752), and William
Paley (1743-1805). The work of Butler, in particular, is thought
to have been a major factor in the fall of deism. 4 These scholars
argued for the rationality of revealed religion and also wrote in
defense of miracles. Some of their works are appreciated even
today as well-reasoned defenses of Christianity.
About the same time that deism and rationalism were developing, British empiricism was emerging in England. The British
empiricists were convinced that argumentation based on deductive reasoning (the scholastics) or on innate principles of the
mind (the rationalists) is not valid. Rather, these scholars based
their epistemology on verification of sense experience. Empirical
investigation is thus the chief test of truth claims.

BACKGROUND OF HUME'S THOUG.HT

The rationalists' epistemology was based on the theory that
reality is essentially rational and that by making the proper
deductions, an individual could achieve knowledge of self,
others, and the world. Reason and particularly deductive logic
were emphasized. Even God could be known, at least to some
extent, by the exercise of reason.
Descartes started with the reality of doubt and the ability to
think. His well-known dictum "I think, therefore I am" is a good
example of rationalism's stress on reason. Beginning with the
truth that we doubt and are therefore not perfect, he reasoned to
the existence of God as the Perfect Being, using the ontological
and cosmological proofs. Since a Perfect Being would not deceive
lesser beings, whatever we can deduce by means of clear and
distinct reasoning concerning the reality of the world must
therefore be true. 1
Spinoza also held that the universe is structured on rational
principles and that it can be known through the proper exercise
of reason. However, dismissing Descartes's mind-body dualism
in favor of pantheism, he maintained that reality is composed of
one substance. Because God, the world, and human beings are
rational, worship is also to be expressed rationally. Ideas such as
these are expressed in his major work, Ethics, published posthumously. Especially noteworthy for our study ofHume is that
Spinoza held that miracles, if understood as violations of nature,
do not occur. 2 Some of the beginnings of biblical criticism can
thus be seen in the work of this philosopher.
Leibniz was another thinker in the tradition of rationalism. In
his key work, Monadology, he described reality in terms of
monads-metaphysical units of force. This theory contrasts with
the view of materialism, in which the atom is the basic component of reality. Leibniz spoke of a hierarchy of monads, culminating in God, the Monad of monads. Accepting some of the
arguments set forth by other rationalists to prove the existence of
God, Leibniz maintained that God ordered the monads in such a
way that the universe is completely rational and that this is "the
best of all possible worlds."
Contemporary with the rise of Continental rationalism was
English deism. Herbert of Cherbury is considered the founder of
this movement. In De Veritate Herbert delineated five "common
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Francis Bacon was one scholar who rejected the methodology
of scholastic theology. In Novum Organum he proposed that inductive logic replace Aristotle's deductive logic. (Aristotle's deductive approach had greatly influenced Western thought since
the late Middle Ages.) Bacon helped to develop the experimental
method, in which data are gathered and organized inductively so
that conclusions can be drawn. His methodology was very
influential for subsequent empirical systems.
John Locke also challenged the thinking of the past. In Essay
Concerning Human Understanding he rejected Descartes's theory
that there are innate ideas in the human mind. Instead, Locke
maintained that the mind is an "empty slate" at birth. Knowledge is obtained by the accumulation of sensory data-this is the
basis of all learning-and by reflection on that data. Thus Locke
rejected the logic of the rationalists in favor of knowledge gained
through the senses. Interestingly enough, Locke also defended
the tenets of Christian theology. In The Reasonableness of Christianiry he argued that miracles validate Christian doctrine and
point to God's activity in the world.
George Berkeley took Locke's theory of knowledge one step
further. In Principles of Human Knowledge and other works he
taught that learning is a mental process. We do not actually
know the material world. All that can be said to exist are other
minds (spirits) and their mental perceptions (ideas). For something to exist, it must be perceived. However, reality does not
cease to exist if it is not observed by a human being, for reality is
still perceived by God, the Eternal Perceiver. Berkeley saw in
this approach a new argument for the existence of God.
In summary, three major Enlightenment schools of
thought-rationalism, deism, and empiricism-provided the
background for the philosophy of David Hume. While often
categorized as an empiricist, Hume was critical of each of these
movements. In much of his work he questioned the epistemological bases of philosophical beliefs, and in so doing he
attempted to establish that some longstanding assumptions were
devoid of epistemological proof.
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impressions-that is, sense perceptions-and ideas-memories
or recollections of these impressions. The validity of an idea can
be tested by tracing it back to the impression. If the idea consistently conforms to the impression, then it is valid. If it does not
conform, then it must be rejected.
However, this explanation implies that Hume was much less
skeptical in epistemological matters than he actually was. Hume
went beyond Locke in asserting that the external world cannot
be verified with absolute certainty. He went beyond Berkeley in
concluding that spirit also cannot be verified and therefore is not
empirically knowable. Here, where he differs with Locke and
Berkeley, we can see Hume's major effect on empiricism. He
postulated that commonly accepted beliefs such as the reality of
the external world and even the existence of the self cannot be
proven to be true. As will be shown below, Hume pointed out
that certainty will more likely come from abstract reasoning
(such as mathematics, logic, or tautologies), while knowledge is
derived from empirical data. Even then, we must rely on probable knowledge and not proven certainties.
One of Hume's best-known teachings was that cause and effect cannot be proven to be true, in spite of the long-held belief
on the part of most men that certain effects follow naturally from
certain causes. In Hume's thinking, we observe these successive
events, but we cannot find the necessary link between them.
Cause and effect can only be accepted by instinct or by faith.
Hl.lme directed stern rebukes at rationalists and deists who
believed that reason could penetrate metaphysical issues such as
the existence of God and other theological truths. In Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion he voiced doubts concerning some aspects of the traditional theistic proofs. In The Natural History of
Religion he asserted that the earliest religion of humankind was
not a monotheism characterized by fundamental rational principles, but rather a polytheism that evolved into monotheism. This
view challenged a cornerstone of deistic thought. In denying the
supremacy of reason, Hume called into question the very basis of
rationalism and deism.
Hume also rejected much of the ethics developed by the
rationalists when he denied that natural law provides any basis
for morals. In yet another critique he maintained that immortality cannot be proven because there is no way to demonstrate the
existence of an immaterial soul.

HUME'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Though often placed in the tradition of British empiricism,
Hume arrived at more radical conclusions. He continued the
emphasis on sense experience by distinguishing between

b
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Hume agreed with Spinoza and some of the deists in rejecting
miracles and special revelation. Few thinkers have created more
doubt concerning the tenets of Christianity than Hume.
In short, Hume believed that there are definite limits in epistemology, and these limits even affect areas that had come to be
regarded as truth or knowledge. Throughout it is important to
note his usage of probability. Although many have held that
Hume denied such concepts as cause and effect, theistic arguments, absolute ethics, and immortality, it is more likely that he
proclaimed such could not be known to be true in the sense of
proof Thus, while such teachings could be true (and they can be
accepted by instinct, habit, or faith), the crux of the matter is
that we cannot know them to be true. Although this appears to be
less of a frontal assault, herein lies much of Hume's influence.
BASIC PREMISES IN HUME'S VIEW OF SCRIPTURE

Hume rejected the claim that Scripture is inspired and is
thereby an authoritative revelation of God to humanity. There
were at least two reasons for this denial of inspiration. One
concerns the particulars in Scripture, and the other has to do with
Scripture as a whole. Hume denied the particular evidences for
Scripture when he asserted that, according to the canons of
probability, miracles and prophecy cannot be used as supernatural indications of the inspiration of Scripture. He rejected
the inspiration of Scripture as a whole by judging that it was not a
work of abstract reasoning, and that it could not be verified by
empirical testing. Therefore, according to Hume, the Scriptures
"contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." 5 Thus, since
neither particular evidences nor the Scripture as a whole can be
accepted as inspired, the Bible cannot be considered a reliable
basis for knowledge. There is no way to know that Scripture
contains God's words for humankind.
We will examine these two premises in more detail. This is not to
say that Hume's other views are not relevant here. However, in
these two ideas Hume was taking direct aim at the veracity of
Scripture. These two premises have been a major factor in the
rejection of the inspiration of Scripture in the twentieth century.

Concerning Miracles
Hume's essay "Of Miracles" is part of An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding (1751), one of his major works. In this essay
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he defines a miracle as «a transgression of a law of nature by a
particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible
agent" (Hume's emphasis). Hume asserts that the laws of nature
are themselves proof against miracles:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as
any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. 6

Not only would the occurrence of miracles entail a breaking of
nature's laws by the will of God (or some other invisible agent),
but such occurrences are extremely improbable. The twofold
evidence supplied by the laws of nature and man's experience of
these laws provides a proof against a miracle. To state it another
way, Hume believes that miracles have not occurred, for they are
dis proven by the superior evidence of the uniformity of nature's
laws, as witnessed by the experience of mankind. 7
To support this major argument, Hume introduces four subsidiary points. 8 First, he asserts that no miracle has ever been
attested by a sufficient number of competent witnesses who are
beyond reproach, suspicion, or delusion.
Second, people like to speak of extraordinary and unique
events and to spread tales about them. In fact, even if a story is
false, people will continue to lie about it in order to promote their
own vanity or some personal cause.
Third, miracles usually occur among barbarous and ignorant
peoples. And lying is a possible explanation in these cases also.
Fourth, the miracles in the various world religions supposedly
support the teachings of that religion. But since such miracles
and teachings conflict with those of other religions, they oppose
and cancel out each other, leaving no instances of valid superna tural even ts.
Hume sought in this way to remove the evidential basis for all
miracles and to show that reports of miracles are untrustworthy.
He realized that by casting doubt on miracles and prophecy, a
form of miracle, he was also destroying Christianity's claim that
Scripture is an inspired revelation from God, since no evidence
would then remain to support such beliefs.
In the concluding paragraphs of his essay, Hume adds that
Christianity is founded on faith and cannot be defended by reason. 9
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(1808-1874). In his hotly debated work A New Life of Jesus,
Strauss claimed that because Hume's essay had completely disproven the possibility of miracles, there was no longer any question in his mind that events that contradict nature's laws do not
occur. 13
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), often referred to as the
father of liberalism, followed Hume's assertion that miracles are
reported most often in areas where there is little knowledge of
nature's laws. Supernatural occurrences must be rejected because they destroy the concept of nature and because there are
no known examples of them. 14
Heinrich Paulus (1761-1851), a German rationalist who desired to judge theology by the criteria of reason, also denied that
miracles were actual supernatural events. He held that the
eyewitnesses of such events in Scripture were not aware of the
laws of nature. For those who know these laws, the actual event
remains, but not the miraculous element in it. Scholars must
therefore discover the natural causes of so-called miracles. 1s
German theologian Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) agreed with
Strauss that nature would be mocked if miracles occurred, since
its laws would be violated. Therefore, such events must be rejected, for nature's laws cannot be denied. 16
French scholar Ernst Renan (1823-1892) stated that Jesus
accepted miracles as common occurrences, believing that they
were not at all out of the ordinary. Jesus' belief was conditioned
by the thought of His day and He was simply not aware that
nature followed certain laws. In this sense, Jesus fell prey to
ancient assumptions.1 7
For German theologian Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908), science
had made great strides in its pursuit of knowledge over the past
centuries. One of its achievements was recognizing that nature's
laws have such regularity they cannot be changed or violated. 1s
Adolf Harnack (1851-1930), one of the last major scholars of
nineteenth-century liberalism, held a view similar to that of his
contemporaries. For ancient peoples miracles appeared to be
common occurrences, because these people did not know about
the existence of the laws of nature. But modern people cannot
accept any events that interrupt these laws. Such events simply
do not occur, and we cannot believe accounts of them. 19
In documenting this influence ofHume's essay, it is not being
asserted that no other Enlightenment thinkers before him ever

Concerning Scripture as a Whole
Hume ends the Enquiry with a brief and almost entirely unexplained but very important statement:
If we take in our hand any volume-of divinity or school

metaphysics, for instance-let us ask, Does it contain any abstract
reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter offact and existence? No. Commit it
then to the flames: for it can contain nothing except sophistry and
illusion (Hume's emphasis).lo

For Hume, then, theology is not a subject concerning which
we can gain verifiable knowledge. Only assertions that involve
abstract reasoning-such as mathematics, logic, and statements
that are true by definition-or assertions that correspond to
empirical data can be said to be knowable. If something is not
true by definition or by evidence based on human experience, it
cannot be known to be true.
Therefore, the Scriptures cannot be used for drawing objective
epistemological conclusions. Hume insisted that theological matters cannot be known to be true. The Scriptures can be believed
by faith alone. This belief was very influential in later
philosophical discussions.
HUME'S INFLUENCE ON THE
DENIAL OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY

The Rejection of Miracles
Hume published the best known and most influential attack
against miracles in the history of intellectual thought. According
to John Herman Randall, Jr., this philosophical protest was so
influential that it was the determining force in causing religious
liberals from Hume's time to the present to reject miracles. l l
Wilbur M. Smith contends that Hume's work was the strongest argument ever raised contrary to belief in miracles. 12
Nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century existentialism and postexistential trends relied on Hume's critique as
the reasoning behind the rejection of miracles.
The nineteenth-century theological school of thought known
as liberalism depended heavily on Hume's reasoning for the rejection of the miraculous. Perhaps the best example of this is
found in the ideas of the German theologian David Strauss

6

34

BIBLICAL ERRANCY

SKEPTICISM HUME

used similar arguments. Rather, as asserted by Randall, Strauss,
and others, liberals followed Hume's thought as the definitive
statement on this subject.
In rejecting miracles, nineteenth-century liberal theologians
not only followed Hume's insistence that the laws of nature cannot be violated, but they also accepted Hume's suggestion that
naturalistic alternatives to miraculous events are more probable
than the actual miracles. 20 These theologians explained accounts
of supernatural intervention in one of two ways.
Some scholars, following views such as those of Paulus, offered
rationalistic alternatives to "supposed" miracles. The most
common technique was to accept the general framework of the
circumstances and surroundings of a miracle as being historical,
but then to provide a naturalistic explanation for the actual
miraculous element. Others, following Strauss, treated the entire
account, including the non miraculous circumstances, as having
little or no basis at all in history. Almost the entire account was
believed to be an expression of mythology meant to convey a
message.
Although Paulus's views gained acceptance by nineteenthcentury liberals, Strauss's mythological explanation was deemed
to be more sophisticated by later critical scholars. In the twentieth century the mythological approach found a strong proponent in Rudolf Bultmann.
This dismissal of miracles, revealing a definite reliance on
Hume's essay, is not only a characteristic of nineteenth-century
theological thought. As already mentioned, twentieth-century
existentialism and contemporary postexistential trends reveal a
similar dependence.
For German New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann
(1884-1976), modern man is too advanced to accept any literal
concept of miracles. In this day of increased knowledge, the
ancient world view cannot be comprehended literally. Because of
the contemporary understanding of the laws of nature, what
used to be considered miraculous is so no longer. Miracles
should therefore be demythologized, or reinterpreted existentially, in order for modern man to grasp the truth being expressed by the myth. 21
According to Paul Tillich (1886-1965), events that are supernatural interferences with nature's laws cannot be accepted.
Such a view, he claimed, distorts the workings of God. A miracle
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may be interpreted as an unusual or astonishing event as long as
it is not believed to contradict naturallaws. 22
English theologian John A. T. Robinson (1919-) concurred
with the idea that the modern world view has no place for
mythological concepts. Accordingly, miracles and other myths
must be rejected as being contrary to nature's laws. Supernatural intervention is just not comprehensible in literal terms to
modern man. The truth embedded in such concepts is what
should be grasped. 23
American theologians Harvey Cox and Lawrence Burkholder
directly cite Hume's essay as the major reason for the twentiethcentury rejection of miracles. Burkholder expresses some reservations about a total acceptance ofHume's thesis but admits its
strong influence on his own views. Cox notes that he and other
scholars have been so profoundly affected by Hume's essay that
they are unable to accept the literal reality of miracles. 24
This brief survey has shown that both nineteenth- and
twentieth-century critical scholars as a whole utilized Hume's
essay to reject and reinterpret miracles. Several explicitly mentioned Hume's work as the key reason for this rejection. Without
doubt, Hume's essay rejecting miracles on epistemological bases
has exerted more influence on the scholarly world than has any
other writing on this subject.

The Empirical Testing of Scripture
Hume's application of his epistemology to Scripture as a
whole also exerted much influence on nineteenth- and
twentieth-century philosophy. To Hume, a statement must contain abstract reasoning or empirical data in order to be known to
be true. Theology is subject to this empirical testing. The development of this empirical test became a chief inspiration for
twentieth-century logical positivism and linguistic analysis.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) further clarified Hume's
twofold distinction between abstract reasoning and experimental
reasoning. Statements that are true by definition he termed
analytical. Assertions that are true by empirical observation he
termed synthetical. 25 Like Hume, Kant also concluded that
metaphysical issues cannot be known, since they cannot be
tested by empirical methods. Religious beliefs can be established, to be sure, but by the exercise of practical reason and not
by sense data.
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French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-:-1857) agreed.~ith
Kant that religious beliefs cannot be estabhshed by empmcal
verification. But Comte went further in insisting that traditional
metaphysics be eliminated. For Comte,. history is ~~aracterized
by three major periods of thought. AnCIent man utilized theological reasoning, endeavoring to lean on God and supernatural
interferences for an understanding of the world. Then man
passed through the metaphysical period, when abstract reasoning
was believed to be the chief means of acquiring knowledge.
Modern man, however, has reached the positive period, when
scientific methodology is the key to knowledge. Humanity thus
has reached the point where reliance on metaphysical speculation is no longer needed. Rather than waste time on theological
issues, concerning which we cannot really gain knowledge, we
should concentrate on what is scientifically verifiable. In this
way, then, Comte said, religious issues are outdated and illegitimate avenues of inquiry.26
In the early twentieth century empirical verification became
an even more crucial issue. Austrian philosopher (and later
Cambridge University professor) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889:1951) stressed the importance of the study of language. In hIS
famous Tractatus he argued that a careful analysis of language
and thought is the chief occupation of philosophy. Many philosophers dealt with meaning~ess issue~ that are n?t open. to
verification such as metaphYSIcal questIons. For WIttgenstem,
we can oniy speak of what we know and otherwise we must
remain silent,21
Another Austrian philosopher, Moritz Schlick (1882-1936),
shared similar vIews. Schlick was the founder of the Vienna
Circle a group of philosophers who were convinced of the need
to an~lyze language. According to Schlick, the major goal for
philosophy is to clarify the meanin.gs of assertions, thereby
providing an empirical reference pomt for knowledge. Many
meaningless debates in philosophy could thus be solved because
of their lack of an empirical criterion of meaning. 28
The teachings ofWittgenstein, Schlick, and the Vienna Circle
influenced the development of the school of thought known as
logical positivism. Logical positivism was po~ularized by t~e
English philosopher A. J. Ayer (1910- ), espeCIally through hIS
work Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Ayer held that.a .sentence
can be said to be significant in any factual way only If It can be
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either verified or falsified according to empirical criteria. If such
a conclusion is not possible and if the sentence is not tautological, then it is meaningless. 29
Emerging from this discussion was the concept known as the
verification principle. Factually meaningful statements are either
analytical, and thereby true by definition, or they are synthetic,
that is, capable of empirical validation. Analytic statements include assertions of pure logic, mathematics, and other tautological statements. They provide no new knowledge concerning the
factual world. Synthetic statements are capable of experiential
verification (or falsification). If statements fall into neither of
these two categories, then they are pronounced factually meaningless. 3o Ayer states that his verification principle is an outgrowth of Hume's thoughts on this subject. 31
The verification principle was not designed to be a test of
truth, as such, b.ut rather an indicator of the meaningfulness of
statements. By applying such criteria to philosophy and clarifying both the purpose and methodology of the philosopher, Ayer
concluded, many of the traditional debates could be by-passed as
meaningless. Theological and ethical assertions, according to
this standard, are literally meaningless because they cannot be
verified or falsified. However, such statements were sometimes
granted an emotive (but not factual) value.
Interestingly enough, Ayer used his standard also against the
statements of atheists and agnostics. Since any proposition about
God is said to be nonsensical, no meaningful statement can be
made to affirm God's nonexistence or even to assert that knowledge about God is impossible. In short, all statements of any sort
concerning God are nonsense, since they cannot be true by
definition or by empirical verification. 32
Moral assertions are likewise said to lack any means by which
they may be experientially tested, since they are not factual
propositions. Rather, they express the speaker's personal
sentiments. For instance, the statement "murder is wrong" is not
factually testable and therefore cannot be proven to be either
right or wrong. It only relates that the one making the statement
believes that murder is wrong. 33
Ayer's verification principle is rejected by philosophers today,
but many scholars still believe that the concept of verifiability or
falsifiability is quite crucial. From such a concern developed the
principle offalsification. Popularized by Antony Flew, this prin-
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ciple has the advantage of being flexible while still providing a
means of testing assertions.
According to Flew, whenever a statement is made, the conditions under which it would be false should be ascertained. In
other words, before we can really know if a statement is valid, we
must also know what facts would make it invalid. 34 Only after
we know that no such probable negation exists can we contend
that the original assertion is valid, providing there are also reasons to accept it as being true.
In spite of the popularity of logical positivism in the early
twentieth century, it was plagued by several inherent weaknesses
discussed in the Evaluation and Critique section below. Indeed,
strictly speaking this school of thought no longer exists. 35 Philosophers of the last few decades have turned from logical
positivism to a less rigid usage of related principles-linguistic
~nalysis ..It has modified the stricter and more dogmatic assumptions of Its predecessor and has turned more attention to the
subject of language analysis. 36
Along with the development ofless rigid standards of veri fication, many linguistic analysts also became convinced that Godtalk was not so meaningless after all. For instance, today many
linguistic analysts are convinced that certain areas of theology
are open to verification. Topics such as God's existence, immortality, and even miracles are discussed in a congenial light and
are defended by some of these scholars.37 This school of thought
no longer presents a unified front against metaphysics. Analytic
philosophers are divided over the question of whether such pursuits are verifiable.
To summarize: The ideas of David Hume have had a tremendous influence on the denial of biblical authority. His rejection of
particular evidences for the inspiration of Scripture-miracles
and prophecy-was accepted by the religious liberals of the
nineteenth century and by the existential and postexistential
scholars of the twentieth century. Hume's assertion that theological works must be judged according to whether their state~ents are true either by definition or by empirical investigation
mfluenced a number of philosophers, especially the Vienna Circle and logical positivists of the first half of the twentieth century.
Following logical positivism, linguistic analysis has developed
and, although less rigid in its evaluation of metaphysics, it still
bears the stamp of David Hume's ideas.

EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE

The Rejection

of Miracles

In spite of the continuing influence of Hume's essay "On
Miracles," I am convinced that there are at least five valid criticisms that invalidate Hume's entire argument.
The first criticism is that in his definitive statements concerning miracles and in his subsequent comparison of these events to
humankind's experience of the laws of nature, Hume commits a
number of errors in logic. For instance, he states:
There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is
here a direct and full protif, from the nature of the fact, against the
existence of any miracle (Hume's italics) .38

It is evident that Hume does not begin his study with an impartiallook at the facts. Earlier we saw that he defines miracles so
that they are totally opposed from the outset by what he terms
"firm and unalterable experience" and "uniform experience." In
this quotation he continues to postulate that all experience
favors the absence of miracles. In addition, he specifically states
that if all experience does not oppose such events, then they
cannot even be called miracles. He concludes by stating that this
is a proof against the miraculous.
In his book Miracles C. S. Lewis notes that Hume can know
that all experience favors his argument only by knowing in advance that all evidence in favor of miracle claims is false. But
since he refuses to investigate miracles, he can know that these
claims are false only by assuming that they do not happen. This
is clearly circular reasoning, for Hume's position is certainly not
evident a priori. 39
The alternative to the approach taken by Hume is to examine
miracles that claim strong experiential support. While speaking
of Christ's miracles, Hume fails to investigate the exceptionally
good evidence for the chief miracle claim of Christianity-the
resurrection of Jesus Christ. It is not valid to rule out an opponent's view by defining one's own position to be true while ignoring evidence to the contrary.
Strangely enough, he even refers to his argument as a proof
against the miraculous when, once again, he assumes that which
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he neglects to prove, namely, that uniform experience and all
other data rest against all miracles. He cannot annul experiential
claims for such events by utilizing faulty definitions, by assuming
the evidence needed to prove one's view (and by doing so circularly), and by not examining the empirical, evidential claims in
favor of the miraculous.
Hume's position is an unproven assumption and cannot disprove miracles. It is most noteworthy that even critical theologians admit that Hume argues circularly in this essay.40
The second criticism is that Hume's conclusion that humankind's experience of the laws of nature provides superior evidence against miracles in no way eliminates the possibility of the
occasional intervention of a power still superior to these laws.
At the outset it must be agreed that there are natural laws. But
although these are known by scientific inquiry to exist, such laws
do not dictate whether occasional abnormalities can occur. In
other words, the mere existence of such laws proves nothing
concerning whether there is a God who is capable of temporarily
suspending them. Thus, Hume should be less concerned with
nature itself and more concerned with whether such a Being has
indeed broken into nature from the outside.
Hume's concept describes what would happen if there is no
intervention into nature by God. However, since it is possible that
God exists and that He has sufficient power to temporarily suspend the laws of nature, no amount of arguing from naturalistic
premises inside a system can ever disprove the possibility that
God has performed a recognizable event in nature from outside
of it. Therefore, the proper question here is not the internal
query of the strength of the laws of nature. Rather, the proper
question concerns the possibility that God, by utilizing superior
strength, temporarily suspended nature's laws in order to cause
such events to occur. It is readily evident that no matter how
strong this natural system is, it is useless to rest one's case on it if
there is a stronger Force.
A valid means of arriving at an answer to this issue of whether
miracles have occurred would be to establish the validity of a
theistic universe. By whatever means this is established, the endeavor would assign much importance to an investigation of the
historical facts surrounding a claimed miracle-such as Jesus'
resurrection-in order to ascertain the probability of that event
occurring in history and being performed by God. It follows that
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if the evidence points to a probable miracle, recognized as being
performed by God, then such evidence is actually superior to the
laws of nature at that moment, for it would reveal that natural law
can be temporarily set aside by a superior Force. This is simply
because, in order to occur, a miracle would involve God's temporary suspension of those laws. 41
It should be noted here that it has not been concluded that
miracles have occurred. It is not the purpose of this essay to
provide such an apologetic. It has only been pointed out that
historical investigation of a miracle claim in a theistic universe
might provide evidence that such an event may have happened.
As such, an interference with the laws of nature might be the
most probable solution.
The third criticism ofHume's thesis is that he ignores a group
of pUIf~orted .miracles that even he admits have outstanding eviden.ce III t~elr favor, namely, the alleged miracles of the Jansemsts of eighteenth-century France. After introducing the case
for the Jansenist miracles, Hume evaluates the type of evidence
they offer, seemingly according to his four supportive criteria. 42
In answer to the first criterion-that miracles must be attested
by an adequate amount of witnesses in order to insure their
validity-Hume admits that many of these Jansenist miracles
"were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction."
Concer~ing the second criterion-that people like to gossip
and even he about wonderful events-Hume admits that among
these witnesses were "determined enemies to those opinions"
who were not able to disprove the Jansenist claims.
. Although the third criteri~m states that miracles occur among
Ignorant and barbarous nations, Hume explains that the Jansenist miracles occurred "in a learned age, and on the most
eminent theatre that is now in the world."43
Hume's fourth criterion states that the miracle claims of many
different religions cancel out rival ideologies. But such a criterion
would be valid only if all miracle claims were true. That one
religion may back its revelation claims with invalid "miracles" is
no reason to reject a religion possessing valid claims. Inept systems cannot cancel a religion that may be supported by evidence
that is shown to be probable. Since obviously not all miracle
claims are valid, historical investigation into evidential claims in

tr

42

SKEPTICISM HUME

BIBLICAL ERRANCY

43

e<;lual~y reasonable to reject the application of these criteria to
h1stoncal accounts of miracles as well.
.The fif!h and last criticism ofHume's stance on the question of
m1racles 1S t~at, although Hume rejected the knowledge of cause
an? efre~t, h1S argument against miracles clearly depends on the
umform1ty of the laws of nature. C. S. Lewis notes that such a
concept of uniformity rests on some form of causal argument.
Hume must assume that the small part of nature that man does
know is the same as that part of nature that man does not know.
He must also :",ssume that nature in the future will follow its past
pattern and V1ce versa. 46 But how can these principles be known
to .be true? T~1Us, the fact that miracles may not be occurring at
~h1S present t1me does not indicate that they have not happened
m the past or that they will not happen tomorrow.
It is interesting that Hume fully realized that this was the case
since he taught in other works that the past can provide no basi~
(othe.r than custom) for statements concerning the future.
No~hmg can be known to be true concerning the future on the
bas1s ofp.ast conformity. Certainly no prooffrom past experience
can prov1de a knowledge of such a transition to the present or
future. 47
However, Hume abandoned this belief when he asserted that
th: uniformity of natu~e's laws could be used as a prod against
m1racles. He thereby vlOlated both his own philosophical principle and the need to ascertain if this is a theistic universe in which
miracles occur in history. Therefore, his argument can by no
m~ans rule out present or future miracles, to say nothing of any
eV1dence for past miraculous events.
We thus conclude our overall critique by asserting that
Hume's method of rejecting miracles must itself be rejected.
As noted above.' H~me's es.say was also the chief inspiration
~or the mode:n r:J~ctlOn of m1racles. Updating Hume's reasonmg and pl~cmg 1t m contemporary garb, it became popular to
argue, for mstance, that no evidence is sufficient to establish a
miracle, since anything occurring in nature must be a natural
event. Related approaches are taken by scholars such as Alastair
McKinnon 48 and Patrick Nowell-Smith. 49 Another example is
Flew's position that miracles are nonrepeatable events whereas
the scientifically esta,hlished. laws of nature are repea;able and
therefore more read1ly venfiable. Therefore, the scientific is
given precedence over the historical, and whenever an event

a theistic universe is needed to ascertain if any religion has a
probable basis.
Hume himself felt that the Jansenist claims had very strong
positive evidence in their favor. How, then, does Hume respond
to the concluding evaluation of the Jansenist miracles? He states:
Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to
the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such
a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous
nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes
of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as sufficient refutation.44
It is evident that Hume dismisses these claims not because of an
insufficient basis of testimony, but because of the assumed impossibility of all miracles. Therefore, even such claims that are
judged to have strong evidence are simply ignored. Again, in a
clear example of circular reasoning, Hume assumes a conclusion
because he has already decided in advance that "no testimony is
sufficient to establish a miracle .... "
The fourth criticism ofHume's argument is that his four supportive criteria are invalid on historical grounds and cannot be
applied to historical investigation.
How many accepted historical events were established by such
unquestionably good witnesses as to guard against all error and
suspicion? How much history is prejudiced by the fact that the
one reporting had much to gain, such as Julius Caesar's accounts
of his military victories? Are the Roman wars with the Gauls to
be judged fictitious? How much history took place among ignorant and barbarous nations? Do we rule out all of ancient history
on this account?
Clearly, by the standards that Hume used to judge miracles,
history itself would be in question. However, it is well recognized
that historical events can be known to a good degree of probability in spite of such questions. In fact, few scholars of the
eig.hteenth century recognized this better than Hume, who is
qUIte well known as a historian 45 as well as a philosopher. Yet,
Hume did not subject his historical endeavors to these
philosophical criteria. The criteria he described as being applicable to records of miracles he would not apply to history as a
whole. The results would obviously be self-defeating for such a
scholar who was also involved in the writing of history. But it is
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suspends the laws of nature, the law is simply expanded to include such events, therefore leaving only nonmiraculous, natural
occurrences. 50 Such scholars additionally argue that a miracle
could not be recognized as such even if one did occur. But it must
likewise be concluded that those who reject miracles based on
Hume's reasoning (including such modern renditions) must also
be said to have done so invalidly. Although not following
Hume's exact arguments, there are at least three points at which
the critique given above also applies generally to these approaches today.
First, it is an improper procedure to define miracles incorrectly or to arbitrarily attempt to mount up the facts against
them so that no evidence could establish their occurrence. It is
thus clearly invalid to automatically state that any event in nature must be a natural event. That conclusion can be reached
only ifthe possibility that God caused the event has already been
ruled out. And that can only be established by an investigation of
the facts. As remarked by C. S. Lewis, when such has not been
done, the naturalist can only assume his position by arguing circularly, for such a position is certainly not evident a priori. 51
Thus, one cannot assume that naturalism is the correct position
by such circular reasoning any more than theists can state the
case so that all such occurrences in question could be called
miracles. Such approaches cannot properly solve this issue.
Such naturalistic theses also fall prey to the second critique of
Hume. It was pointed out that one cannot determine, even by
viewing the scientific evidence for the laws of nature, whether
God intervened by a superior power to perform miracles. It
should be obvious here that if a miracle has occurred, it cannot
be called a natural event just becaus~ it happened in nature or
because science has established these laws. Indeed, miracles must
normally happen in nature if men are going to know of them at
all. But the crucial question of the cause of the event, which .is the
most important factor, is not determined by such naturalistic
approaches. God could still have caused such an event to occur in
nature by exerting power superior to that of the natural laws.
Therefore, our earlier point should be remembered-if probable
evidence does indicate that a recognizable miracle has occurred
in a theistic universe, then it provides superior evidence because it
indicates that the laws of nature, however strong or scientifically
verified, were temporarily suspended.
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We noted above that Hume neglected to examine the possibility that God exists and that He acted in history to perform a
miracle. This criticism also applies to the nineteenth- and
twentieth-century reworkings of Hume's thesis, because if there
is probable evidence for a recognizable miracle having occurred
in a theistic universe, it cannot be dismissed simply by calling it
a natural event. Neither can these events be dismissed by referring to the scientific verification of the laws of nature and then by
expanding or adjusting these laws accordingly. This has already
been shown in our previous two points and we will now present a
third point against these naturalistic approaches.
It is true that if a miracle repeatedly occurs in a predictable
manner under certain conditions, then it is probably more appropriate to attempt to adjust the law than to continue to call it a
supernatural event. There are, however, several indications that
an original law is correct and that a real miracle may have
occurred and that it is recognizable as such. For instance, if a
given law applies in all instances except the one in question, we
have a good indication that the law is valid, especially since
science relies so much on repeatability. Additionally, it may be
virtually impossible to arrive at a new law that allows for the
event, since it is so contrary to known reality. Also, a new law
may endeavor to account for an event at the expense of allowing
so many abIlormalities that the original purpose behind the law
is lost-in other words, it is no longer workable, due to its being
qualified to such a large extent. 52
Therefore, if a probable event had certain characteristics, a
good case could be made for it being a miracle. The strongest
example would be an event that had at least four features. First,
this occurrence would be nonrepeatable; second, it would be
contrary to at least one law of nature; third, this would be the
only known exception to this law; fourth, there would be no
viable means by which to change the law without losing the law's
purpose or workability, especially when the event is so contrary
to known reality.
This is not to say that occurrences without such characteristics
cannot be miraculous. Rather, it is being asserted that events
that do have all four features present a much stronger case, as
well as providing additional pointers as to its recognizability as a
miracle.
This brings us back to our major critique, which asserts that
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the facts must be examined in order to determine if such events
have actually happened. I suggest that a strong refutation of
both Burne and those who generally accept his thesis is that the
resurrection ofJesus can be said, according to probability, to be
an actual historical event performed by God in a theistic universe. Jesus' resurrection fulfills the four criteria listed above.
The raising of Jesus was a nonrepeatable event and was
definitely contrary to the natural laws governing the process
called death. This event is the only probable exception to these
laws and there is no known means to modifY or change them.
The universal law of death is that a dead person does not rise
by any known natural means, especially in a glorified body, as
reported by the eyewitnesses. Interestingly enough, Burne
explicitly stated that the resurrection of a dead man would be
a true miracle, necessitating the involvement of supernatural
powers. 53
The purpose here is not to present an apologetic for Jesus'
resurrection and for a Christian theistic world view, but to show
that, as a probable historical event, this thesis offers a final and
substantial criticism of Burne's position and also disproves those
who have followed Burne's thesis. It is obvious that if a miracle
has occurred, then the laws of nature were temporarily suspended, and positions to the contrary are incorrect.
Bere we conclude our critique of Burne's essay against miracles and the views of those who have followed along similar lines
of thought. Five criticisms were leveled at Burne and three criticisms were reapplied to contemporary approaches which follow
Burne. In conclusion, it was found that miracles cannot be ruled
out a priori. The possibility must be allowed that in a theistic
universe God could have temporarily suspended the laws of nature by a superior power in order to perform a miracle; therefore,
we must investigate the evidence to ascertain ifsuch an event has
occurred.
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neither test applies, then the work is said to be factually meaningless. This testing by means of empirical criteria also
influenced philosophers, especially the logical positivists of the
early twentieth century. In spite of the popularity of various
types of empirical testing, we will note three criticisms that reveal that strict applications of this methodology are invalid.
The major problem for logical positivism was that the verification principle could not be verified. In other words, it failed its
own test. This principle obviously cannot be true by abstract
reasoning. First, such a position cannot be defined to be true.
Second, tautological statements are said to reveal no real information about the world, whereas the verification principle is
plainly intended to communicate a standard of meaningfulness.
Nor can this principle be true by empirical testing, because sense
data cannot prove that the only valid way to gain knowledge is
by empiricism. In short, there was no way to verifY the verification principle itself. Thus, positivism failed by its own epistemological standard. By endeavoring to show that theology was
factually invalid, positivism factually invalidated itself.
It is interesting that Ayer agreed with this criticism and
modified the verification principle in later years. 54 This criticism
is generally accepted today, so that, strictly speaking, logical
positivism no longer exists as a philosophical school of thought. 55
This criticism applies not only to Burne and to logical
positivists but also to other philosophers who advocate that,
except for statements that a[/~ true by definition, only empirically
verifiable truths are meaningful. This includes the views of
Comte, Schlick, and the Vienna Circle. In fact, this critique
applies to any view that asserts that the only (or the chief) means
of acquiring knowledge is by sense data. Briefly stated, there is
no way to demonstrate that this is the only (or major) approach
to epistemological issues. There is no way to prove that empirical
investigation occupies such an exclusive (or semiexclusive) position.
Our second major criticism of these positions is that the possibility of miracles is often still rejected through the influence of
Burne's essay. In other words, these philosophers have followed
Burne in dismissing miracles not only because of the empirical
criteria just discussed (criticism number one) but also because of
man's experience of the laws of nature as seen earlier in this
chapter. An example has already been noted above in the ap-

The Use oj Empirical Criteria
Burne not only greatly influenced the rejecting of particular
miraculous evidences for the inspiration of Scripture; he also
doubted inspiration as a whole by suggesting that any theolog~
cal work, such as the Bible, should be tested to see whether It
contains abstract reasoning (and is thereby true by definition) or
experimental reasoning (and is true by empirical data). If
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proach of Flew. However, it has been shown how Hume's reasoning against miracles (and those who follow him) is a second
failure to explain away the miraculous. It should now be obvious
that such attempts are still invalid for reasons such as those set
forth earlier.
The third major criticism of such naturalistic hypotheses is
that, once the strict application of empirical criteria is found to
be faulty, theological issues can no longer be judged to be
meaningless. Even Ayer admits that statements that cannot be
said to be true either by definition or by empirical data may still
be meaningful. In fact, he explicitly asserts that metaphysical
statements cannot be eliminated without in-depth analyses of
particular supportive arguments. 56
Once again, establishing a theistic universe relegates much
meaning to an investigation of history to ascertain if recognizable
miracles have occurred. Such is a meaningful endeavor. Interestingly, if the resurrection of Jesus was shown to be historically valid, this would be a decision in favor of an empirical
event, established by the sense experience of the earliest eyewitnesses. Thus, even by the standards of a strict empiricism, there
would be a solid miraculous basis for Christianity. If this or
other miracles were shown to be historically (and empirically)
valid, they would also constitute a final refutation of such views,
as noted earlier.
Therefore, Hume's empirical criterion of testing is also not a
valid procedure. Strict applications of such empirical standards
of verification are clearly invalid. Indeed, some linguistic
analysts do believe that metaphysical issues are not only meaningful but verifiable, as mentioned above.
To be sure, the philosophy of David Hume has been instrumental in causing many of the contemporary doubts concerning
the inerrancy of the Scripture. His twofold support of errancy in
the form of his essay against miracles and his proposal for empirical testing especially influenced nineteenth- and twentiethcentury philosophical and theological schools of thought. It is
possible that his influence in this area is unparalleled in the
history of philosophy. Yet, it is plain that both of these lines of
argument, having been themselves disproven, have failed to disprove either the inspiration of the Scriptures or the miraculous
element contained in it.
Thus we conclude this essay by asserting that both Hume's
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position against miracles and his strict use of empirical testing
are in:ralid. Several criticisms have been applied to each concept,
r:vealmg ~hat they are abortive attempts to dismiss the inspiratIOn ofScnpture, as are modern renditions of similar argumentation. It was not our purpose here to construct a positive apologetic for inspiration or for God's existence, miracles, eternal life,
or other aspects of theology that have been called into question
by such methods. Yet such an apologetic is a distinct possibility,
especially when such critical attempts fail. 57

